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Boys Will Be Boys: Peer Sexual Harassment in
Schools and the Implications of Davis v. Monroe
County Board of Education
Tianna McClure*
Students, as a group, do nothing. Teachers do nothing. Schools do
nothing. The government does nothing. And the courts do nothing.
The burden falls squarely on the shoulders of sexually harassed
children, and the message sent to them is "deal with it. "'
For years when the topic of peer-to-peer sexual harassment has arisen,
the refrain among courts and educators has been "boys will be boys."2
Some argue that no one would react in this manner today, but unfortunately
this is not the case. "Teasing, kicking, shoving and pokes in the face are
annoying and hurtful to any child who is victimized by them. Such
behavior may even leave them quite traumatized and upset... [but] such
conduct.., is not actionable., 3 Furthermore, in determining the issue of
peer-to-peer sexual harassment, the Supreme Court has stated that
"[t]easing is as standard in elementary schools as the ABC's."4 These
comments not only underplay the severity and prevalence of sexual
harassment in schools, but they fail to recognize the true magnitude of the
problem. Sexual harassment among students goes far beyond simple
* Third year law student at the University of California, Hastings College of the Law;
2000-2001 Symposium Editor, 2001 Managing Editor, Hastings Women's Law Journal. I
would like to thank Professor Cheryl Hanna, Damara Moore, Heather Kirlin and Dominique
Tauzin.
1. Alexandra A. Bodnar, Arming Students for Battle: Amending Title IX to Combat the
Sexual Harassment of Students by Students in Primary and Secondary School, 5 S. CAL.
REV. L. & WOMEN'S STuD. 549, 552 (1996).
2. Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1560, 1565 (N.D. Cal. 1993), rev'd in
part, 54 F.3d 1447, 1455 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Richard Homrighouse, a counselor at
Kenilworth Junior High School in Petaluma, California, in response to a sexual harassment
claim filed by one student against another student).
3. Manfredi v. Mount Vernon Bd. of Educ., et al., 94 F. Supp. 2d 447, 454 (S.D.N.Y.
2000).
4. Associated Press and Reuters, Supreme Court Weighs Responsibility for Sexual
Harassment in Schools, Jan. 12, 1999 (visited on September 17, 2000)
<http://www.cnn.com/us/9901/scotus.sex.02/index.html>.
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"teasing," including acts of physical violence and rape.
"ALMA MCGOWEN"
In 1996, Alma McGowen filed a lawsuit against the Spencer Board of
Education, alleging that she had been subjected to intentional
discrimination as a result of peer conduct in violation of Title IX of the
Education Amendments Between 1992 and 1995, McGowen was
subjected to severe emotional and physical abuse at the hands of other
students. During her sixth-grade year, students yelled "Oh, there's that
German gay girl" and a high school student asked her to describe oral sex.
After McGowen complained to school officials, the student continued to
curse at her and "was even more vulgar than before."'6
When McGowen entered high school in 1993, the school principal's
nephew confronted her and demanded to know if she was a lesbian in front
of other students. The official school response came from the assistant
vice-principal, who told her that the boys were just flirting with her because
they thought she was cute.7 The assistant principal then told her that she
should just "be friendly."' Throughout the remainder of the year, students
regularly pushed her into walls, stole and destroyed her homework and
grabbed her bookbag. In another incident, a male student in her class
called her and other female students "whores" and "motherfuckers," hit
them, snapped their bras and touched them in sexually explicit ways. The
student also stole a pen from McGowen's bag, and when she tried to
retrieve her pen, the student stabbed her in the hand. After McGowen
reported the incident to school officials, the student told McGowen that he
would not get into trouble because he was the son of a school board
member.9
Perhaps the most violent incident occurred while McGowen was in her
seventh-grade science class. While the teacher was out of the room, two
boys held McGowen's hands, while other students grabbed her hair and
yanked her shirt off. It was only when a male student began to take off his
pants and said he was going to have sex with McGowen that another
student intervened. The only school response was that the teacher "spoke"
with the boys. The harassment then escalated to the point that McGowen
was "propositioned or touched inappropriately in virtually every class.
[McGowen] testified that the more she complained to the principals, . . . the
harassment... increased." The years of harassment that McGowen was
5. See Vance, et al. v. Spencer County Pub. Sch. Dist., et al., 231 F.3d 253, 257 (6th Cir.
2000).





subjected to resulted in her withdrawing from school."°
"THE SPUR POSSE"
In the spring of 1993, another case came to media attention that
illustrated the true severity of sexual harassment in schools." A group
nicknamed the "Spur Posse" garnered massive media attention after nine
members were arrested on charges of rape and other related charges.' 2 In
complaints filed by seven young women and girls, the young women
alleged that they were victims of harassment, intimidation and gang rape by
members of the "posse."'" After one of the victims reported being raped,'4
members of the "Spur Posse," while on school premises, threatened to kill
her, physically assaulted her and called her derogatory names such as
"bitch," "whore" and "slut.' 5  In light of this, the young woman
approached school administrators in an effort to receive help.'6
Unfortunately, the administration merely validated the young men's actions
through their failure to aid the young woman and their failure to discipline
the members of the "posse."
As if this behavior alone were not serious enough to have merited the
attention of school administrators, members of the "Spur Posse," while on
school property, sold T-shirts that read "Member of the Lakewood High
Posse."'7 These T-shirts contained illustrations of stick figures representing
a point system, which awarded a point to members each time they achieved
orgasm with a different female.'8
While the facts of this case alone are sufficient to shock the conscience
of any person, the response by the school and some members of the
community was almost as outrageous as the conduct of the members of the
"posse." A father of one of the "posse" members stated that the
competition was nothing more than "healthy teenage fun" and that the girls
were simply promiscuous.' 9
In the end, a majority of the members of the "posse" were subject to
minimal amounts of censor and punishment by the school and the
10. See id. at 257. In September 1998, a jury returned a verdict in favor of McGowen,
awarding her $220,00. See id. at 258. While this action was pending on appeal, the
Supreme Court decided Davis. See id.
11. See Jill Smolowe, Sex With a Scorecard, TIME, Apr. 5, 1993, at 41.
12. See id.
13. See Michelle Stacey, Bad Boys, SEVENTEEN, Nov. 1993, at 124.
14. See Janet Wiscombe, An American Tragedy: She Paid the Price for Speaking Out,
L.A. TIMEs, Mar. 22, 1996, at El.
15. Id.
16. See id.
17. See David Ferrell & Somini Sengupta, A Stain Spreads in Suburbia, L.A. TIMEs, Apr.
6, 1993, at Al, A22-23.
18. See id.
19. Seth Mydans, 7 of 9 Califomia Youths are Freed in a Case of Having Sex for Points,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1993, at A14.
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community." In fact, after the story began to garner media attention, the
Principal of Lakewood High School, Mike Escalante, proposed that rather
than discipline the young men involved, some of the victimized young
women should transfer to other schools. 21 In response to this, a mother of
one of the victimized girls stated quite eloquently: "Our daughters have to
go?... I don't see why they can't get the kids together and say this will
not be tolerated. If handling it means getting rid of the victims, then
they're sure not handling it very well. 2
I. INTRODUCTION
The recent Supreme Court decision in Davis v. Monroe County Board
of Education, 23 recognized for the first time that a school district may be
held liable for failure to respond adequately to peer sexual harassment
under Title IX. While the issue of teacher on student harassment is no less
serious,24 this Note specifically addresses the issue of peer-to-peer sexual
harassment in schools. In Part II of this Note, I identify and discuss recent
court cases that have established a school's liability for sexual harassment
under Title IX, looking, in part, to the case law surrounding Title VII. Part
III examines the jurisdictional conflicts regarding peer sexual harassment
prior to the Supreme Court's holding in Davis. In Part IV, I discuss and
examine the holding and rationale of Davis. Part V highlights policy
considerations, including the applicability of applying a loci parentis
standard to schools and the use of state law remedies as an alternative to
Title IX. Part V concludes with an examination of the ways in which
Congress can amend Title IX, thus providing students the level of
protection that they deserve. But, before this analysis continues, it is
necessary to define sexual harassment and consider the societal factors that
contribute to it.
Under the California Education Code, sexual harassment is defined as:
[U]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and
20. After the extensive press coverage of the incidents, which occurred at Lakewood
High School, the Los Angeles District Attorney's Office charged two of the individuals with
child molestation for allegedly engaging in sexual intercourse with a ten-year-old girl. The
District Attorney's Office declined to prosecute the other fifteen claims that were filed,
explaining that, "Although there is evidence of unlawful sexual intercourse, it is the policy
of this office not to file criminal charges where there is consensual sex between teenagers."
While "the District Attorney's Office in no way condones the callous and cruel behavior of
the Spurs.... arrogance and contempt for young women.., cannot form the basis for
criminal charges." David Ferrell, 2nd Molestation Charge Filed in Teen Sex Scandal, L.A.
TIMES, Apr. 20, 1993, at B1, B1-B3.
21. See Ferrell & Sengupta, supra note 17, at A23.
22. Id.
23. 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
24. For a discussion of teacher on student sexual harassment, see Franklin v. Gwinnett
County Public Schools, 503 U.S. 60 (1992) and Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School
District, 524 U.S. 274 (1998).
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other verbal, visual, or physical conduct of a sexual nature, made
by someone from or in the work or educational setting, under any
of the following settings:
Submission to the conduct is explicitly or implicitly made a
term or a condition of an individual's employment, academic
status, or progress.
Submission to, or rejection of, the conduct by the individual is
used as the basis of employment or academic decisions
affecting the individual.
The conduct has the purpose or effect of having a negative
impact upon the individual's work or academic performance,
or of creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work or
educational environment.
Submission to, or rejection of, the conduct by the individual is
used as the basis for any decision affecting the individual
regarding benefits and services, honors, programs, or activities
available or through the educational institution.'
Furthermore, Bernadette Marcezly, a professor of education at
Cleveland State University, has defined sexual harassment in schools as:
Sexual harassment is defined by the victim; if an individual finds
the comments or physical contact to be unwelcome, then it is
harassment and sexual harassment is a continuum of unwanted
behaviors ranging from spoken or written comments or stares [pep
rally skits ... which degrade females, graffiti in bathroom walls or
a playboy centerfold used as a high school text book cover by male
students are some of the least egregious examples in the literature]
to actual physical assault and attempted rape.26
In the workplace, sexual harassment has been defined as:
Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of Sec. 703 of Title
VII. Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and
other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature when... (3)
such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering
with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating,
25. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 212.5 (1998).
26. Maureen 0. Nash, Student on Student Sexual Harassment: If Schools are Liable,
What about the Parents?, 31 CREIGHTON L. REv. 1131, 1133 (1998) (quoting Elaine Yaffe,
Expensive, Illegal and Wrong: Sexual Harassment in Our Schools, 77 PHi DELTA KAPPAN 1,
2-3 (1995)).
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hostile, or offensive working environment.27
Therefore, a working definition of sexual harassment includes sexual
attention, which is unwanted, from peers, teachers, school administrators
and coaches, "or anyone the victim must interact with in order to fulfill...
school duties, ''28 which creates a hostile or offensive educational
environment. This unwanted attention includes comments that are sexual
in nature, jokes, gestures, being touched or groped in a sexual manner,
being shown sexually explicit pictures, messages or notes, being the target
of sexual rumors and/or being forced to engage in sexual activity.29 Having
established a working definition of what may constitute sexual harassment
in a school setting, we are left with the question: What causes such
behavior in students?
A. FROM WHERE DOES THE PROBLEM OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN
SCHOOLS STEM?
In today's society, the problem of sexual harassment is prevalent in
schools and in the workplace. It is so prevalent that many educators
"ignore, downplay or [are] unaware of sexual harassment,"30 even assuming
it to be an ordinary part of the school day--"a lot of people do it, it's no big
deal."3' "Although employers are recognizing and responding to sexual
harassment in the workplace, schools are still in the early stages of deciding
what to do about peer sexual harassment."32
In response to the Supreme Court's decision in Davis, schools must
begin to understand the nature and severity of sexual harassment by
students in schools or face the possibility of monetary damages. Schools
must recognize that they are responsible for monitoring student behavior
and preventing or remedying peer sexual harassment. In order to achieve
this level of understanding, it is imperative that one considers what societal
factors contribute to the problem of sexual harassment in schools.
While a common refrain when addressing sexual harassment in schools
27. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (2000).
28. Jill Suzanne Miller, Title VI and Title VII: Happy Together as a Resolution to Title IX
Peer Sexual Harassment Claims, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 699, 707 (1995) (quotations and
citations omitted).
29. See Andrea Giampetro-Meyer et al., Sexual Harassment in Schools: An Analysis of
the "Knew or Should Have Known" Liability Standard in Title IX Peer Sexual Harassment
Cases, 12 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 301, 303 (1997).
30. JOHN F. LEWIS & SUSAN C. HASTINGS, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN EDUCATION 20 (2d
ed. 1994).
31. AMERICAN Ass'N OF UNIV. WOMEN EDUC. FOUND., HOSTILE HALLWAYS: THE AAUW
SURVEY ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN SCHOOLS 12 (1993) (noting that thirty-seven percent of
student harassers gave the answer that it was no big deal to explain their behavior)
[hereinafter AAUW survey]. Louis Harris and Associates conducted the survey, which
contained surveys of 1,632 public school students from more than seventy-nine schools
across the United States. See id.
32. Nash, supra note 26, at 1131.
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is that "boys will be boys," the causes of sexual harassment stem from
complex circumstances, including gender stereotypes and myths. There are
many myths regarding sexual harassment in schools, including-it is just
teasing, it is a natural part of adolescence or the harassment will stop if a
person simply ignores the offensive behavior.3
Perhaps more importantly, the gender stereotypes that are prevalent in
society in general contribute to and encourage sexual harassment. Gender
stereotypes "are not based on factual information [but] are the thoughts or
cognitions we hold about the supposed nature of women and men...
women are typically perceived as helpful, loyal, patient, submissive,
dependent, nurturing, and sexual... men are typically perceived as
independent, dominant and aggressive."' The "deeply engrained idea of
man as the powerful protector of woman has been a compelling and
pervasive component of every child's education and socialization. Too
often the hidden curriculum of our schools teaches our students that power
over women is a basic right and responsibility of manhood."'35 Therefore,
"[w]hile girls are learning that they are not as valuable as boys, boys are
learning that they are more important than girls and come to believe that
girls [do not] have the same rights. 36
For girls, school becomes the place where their aspirations are
stymied, their self-confidence is all but destroyed and their
physical integrity is stripped. For boys, school becomes the place
where they learn not only that discrimination and harassment are
acceptable, but also where they learn how to discriminate and
harass."
The way children, boys in particular, view the members of the opposite sex
and members of their own sex is a key component in understanding what
are the underlying causes of sexual harassment among children,
adolescents and adults.
33. See AUDREY COHAN ET AL., SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND SEXUAL ABUSE: A HANDBOOK
FOR TEACHERS AND ADMINISTRATORS, 58-60 (1996).
34. ANNE C. LEVY & MICHELLE A. PALUDI, WORKPLACE SEXUAL HARASSMENT 51
(1997).
35. ROBERT J. SHOOP & DEBRA L. EDWARDS, How TO STOP SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN OUR
SCHOOLS: A HANDBOOK AND CURRICULUM GUIDE FOR ADMINISTRATORS AND TEACHERS 31
(1994). But see Christina Hoff Sommers, The WarAgainst Boys, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, May
2000, at 59-74. In this article, Sommers argues that in reality girls are faring better under
the current educational system than boys. She argues that girls receive higher grades, have
higher educational goals, and enroll in more advanced placement courses. Conversely, boys
are more likely to be suspended or expelled from school, have higher rates of suicide and
are less likely to go to college. See id. at 59-74.
36. SnooP & EDWARDS, supra note 35, at 46.
37. Bodnar, supra note 1, at 565.
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B. THE PREVALENCE OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN SCHOOLS.
Peer-to-peer sexual harassment begins as early as kindergarten,
continues throughout elementary school and persists into high school,
where harassment is unfortunately the norm rather than the exception.
Take for example an Illinois school district where male students routinely
participate in "grab-the-girls-in-the-private-parts week." "' Similarly, in a
Montana elementary school boys participate in "flip-up Friday" where they
try to lift up as many girls' skirts as they can.39 Across the United States,
incidents such as these and others including pulling down girls' pants and
biting girls' body parts have become so common that they are referred to in
slang as "sharking" and "spiking."4
While the majority of empirical studies conducted on peer sexual
harassment have focused on the university or collegiate level, a
comprehensive national study was conducted in 1993 by the American
Association of University Women Educational Foundation (hereinafter
"AAUW survey").4' The survey, which defined sexual harassment as
"unwanted and unwelcome sexual behavior that interferes with your life,"
asked the students if another student, teacher or other school employee had
done any of the following:
made sexual comments, jokes, gestures or looks;
written sexual graffiti on the bathroom or locker room walls about
the student;
shown, given, or left the student sexual messages or pictures;
spread sexual rumors about the student's sexual activity or
orientation;
spied on the student while dressing or showering;
flashed or mooned the student;
touched, grabbed or pinched the student;
intentionally brushed against the student in a sexual way;
pulled the student's clothing in a sexual way;
38. Kristin M. Eriksson, What Our Children Are Really Learning at School: Using Tith
IX to Combat Peer Sexual Harassment, 83 GEo. L.J. 1799, 1799 (1995).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1799-1800.
41. See AAUW Survey, supra note 31, at 7.
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blocked or cornered the student in a sexual way; or
forced the student to engage in kissing or something sexual, other
than kissing.
42
The 1993 Survey revealed what many students, school administrators,
teachers and practitioners already knew-that eighty-one percent, or four
out of five students, had been subjected to, and the target of, "unwanted
and unwelcome behavior that interfered with their lives., 43 The majority of
this harassment is not teacher on student, but rather it is peer-to-peer sexual
harassment. Eighty-six percent of the girls and seventy-one percent of the
boys who responded that they had been harassed were targeted by "a
current or former student at school. ' 4 Likewise, sixty-six percent of the
boys and fifty-two percent of the girls surveyed admitted to having sexually
harassed another student.45
This survey illustrates the pervasiveness of peer-to-peer sexual
harassment. Sexual harassment between students is often "misconstrued as
a normal rite of passage [or] as awkward 'getting-to-know-you' behaviors,"
and thus perceived as nothing more than harmless adolescent behavior such
as "flirting." However, "this ignorance about the dangerous effects of
harassing behavior all too often results in lifelong injury to its victims."
The ramifications of sexual harassment can be devastating to all victims,
but it is especially harmful to those who are victimized while in the process
of changing from a child to an adolescent and adult. It is at this time that
one's perceptions about the world and oneself are formed. To be
victimized sexually at this time is something that cannot, and should not, be
ignored by the schools or by the courts.
C. THEEMOTIONAL, PHYSICAL AND EDUCATIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF
SExuAL HARASSMENT IN SCHOOLS.
The consequences of having been sexually harassed by one's peers can
be severe, affecting one's physical, mental and emotional well-being. The
emotional responses triggered by the harassment may manifest themselves
as physical problems, which can include: insomnia, ulcers, headaches,
weight loss or gain, respiratory problems, eating disorders and suicide
attempts." Furthermore, some researchers have suggested that these effects
42. Helena K. Dolan, The Fourth R-Respect: Combating Peer Sexual Harassment in the
Public Schools, 63 FORDHAM L. REv. 215,219 n.37 (1994) (citing AAUW 1993 Survey).
43. AAUW Survey, supra note 31, at7.
44. Id. at 11.
45. See id. atll-12.
46. Monica L. Sherer, Comment, No Longer Just Child's Play: School Liability Under
Title IX for Peer Sexual Harassment, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 2119, 2130 (1993) (footnotes and
citations omitted).
47. Bodnar, supra note 1, at 559.
48. See Jollee Faber, Expanding Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 to
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can be characterized as the "sexual harassment syndrome," 9 manifested by
the following symptoms:
general depression;
undefined dissatisfaction with classes;
sense of powerlessness, helplessness and vulnerability;
loss of academic self-confidence;
feelings of isolation from other students;
fear and anxiety;
inability to concentrate; and
alcohol and drug dependency. 0
Most importantly, sexual harassment in schools undermines the very
educational process that is supposed to occur in school. As Adrienne Rich
noted:
Women and men do not receive an equal education because...
women are perceived not as sovereign beings but as prey .... The
undermining of self, of women's sense of her right to occupy space
and walk freely in the world, is deeply relevant to education. The
capacity to think independently ... to assert ourselves mentally, is
inseparable from our ... feelings of personal integrity. Because
sexual harassment affects girls' and young women's self-esteem
and self-confidence, interferes with their emotional health, forces
them to change their behavior at school, and directly affects their
course of study, academic accomplishments and learning
Prohibit Student to Student Sexual Harassment, 2 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 85, 89 (1992). For
example:
A young woman in the eighth grade is writing out her last will and
testament... Life seems unbearable because the school day has become a
living hell. The boys have been incessantly taunting her about the size of
her breasts to the point where she cannot face them at school. She would
walk to school and, all of a sudden, she would hear "moo" bellowing out
from a group of boys. This behavior occurred before school, after school,
between classes, during classes, and at lunchtime. Her mother complained
but the school refused to take any action. The school board's response:
"boys will be boys."
Bodnar, supra note 1, at 561 n. 106 (quoting Sherer, supra note 46, at 2120).
49. Vita C. Rabinowitz, Coping with Sexual Harassment, in IVORY POWER: SEXUAL
HARASSMENT ON CAMPUS 103, 112-13 (Michele Paludi ed. 1990).
50. Id.
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environments, the mere presence of sexual harassment clearly
limits girls and young women in their educational pursuits.5'
It is important to remember that what occurs in a school setting can
affect an adolescent for years to come and therefore shape society. The
"school environment provides an important context for the development of
self-esteem" among boys and girls.'2 "It is within the school setting that
children and adolescents experience varying degrees of success in both
academic tasks and social integration with peers.'  By interfering with
healthy development, sexual harassment in schools leads to a myriad of
problems. One very serious consequence is an increased likelihood of
delinquency. Adolescents who engage in delinquent behavior tend to be
unable to recognize their own acceptability and value. 4 There appears to
be a direct correlation to a child's or an adolescent's perception of self and
involvement in delinquent or criminal behavior.55 The deprivation of
access to an equal education is only one result of peer sexual harassment.
However, it is also one that now constitutes a violation of federal law.56 In
accord with the Supreme Court decision recognizing peer sexual
harassment as actionable under Title IX, educators, parents and the
community as a whole must continue to reinforce that sexual harassment is
legally and ethically unacceptable. It is not simply a case of "boys being
boys."
II. NOTABLE COURT CASES ESTABLISHING A SCHOOL'S
LIABILITY FOR SEXUAL HARASSMENT
The judicial interpretation of Title IX recognizes that sexual
harassment in the context of education constitutes sex discrimination and is
therefore actionable under Title IX.57 Alexander v. Yale University, the first
case to discuss the issue of sexual harassment as a form of gender
discrimination under Title IX, established three important prerequisites for
school liability under Title IX These included that:
the school must possess actual notice of the alleged sexual
51. Bodnar, supra note 1, at 563-64 (quoting ADRIENNE RICH, TAKING WOMEN STUDENTS
SERIOUSLY (1978), reprinted in ON LIEs, SECRETS, AND SmENC E 237, 241-42 (1979)).
52. Sandra Bosacki et al., Field Independence-dependence and self-esteem in





56. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 629-32 (1999).
57. See Alexander v. Yale Univ., 459 F. Supp. 1, 4 (D. Conn. 1977), aff'd, 631 F.2d 178
(2d Cir. 1980) (discussing the issue of whether a school's failure to remedy allegations of
sexual harassment made by students against members of the faculty has the effect of
condoning the behavior and thus constituting gender discrimination under Title IX).
58. Id.
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harassment and fail to take steps to remedy the situation;
the alleged harassment must have been conducted by a faculty
member as an agent of the school; and
the sexual demands must be in exchange for an educational
opportunity or benefit. 9
It was not until 1979, however, that the United States Supreme Court
held in Cannon v. University of Chicago, that Title IX confers on plaintiffs
the implied right to maintain a private cause of action against educational
institutions that violate the Act's provisions.6° The Court stated that while
it is better for Congress to explicitly specify its intent for plaintiffs to have
the right to maintain a private cause of action,
the Court has long recognized that under certain limited
circumstances the failure of Congress to do so is not inconsistent
with an intent on its part to have such a remedy available to the
persons benefited by its legislation. Title IX presents the atypical
situation in which all of the circumstances ... supportive of an
implied remedy are present.
Subsequent to the decisions in Alexander and Cannon, courts have
heard various claims regarding a school board's liability for sexual
harassment. For years the standard to show school liability for sexual
harassment remained the standard set forth in Alexander. However, courts
began to apply the principles established under Title VII to Title IX cases.
Therefore, in order to discuss school sexual harassment case law in depth,
an analysis of Title VII employment case law is necessary.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employers from
discriminating against employees with respect to "compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin. 62
Two theories of liability have developed through case law under Title
VII: quid pro quo and hostile work environment. The traditional standard
required that a plaintiff demonstrate that there was quid pro quo harassment
where an employee's superior made a demand for sexual favors in
exchange for employment.63 In order to establish a prima facie case the
plaintiff has to prove that unwelcome comments or conduct occurred and
59. Id.
60. 441 U.S. 677, 717 (1979). In spite of the fact that Alexander identified liability for
sexual harassment under Title IX, three years passed before the Court definitively
interpreted Title IX to grant parties a private cause of action.
61. Id.
62. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000).
63. See, e.g., Ellerth v. University of Tex. at Dallas, 52 F.3d 543, 545 (5th Cir. 1995).
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the conditions of the plaintiff's employment were contingent upon his or
her response to those comments or actions.6 Further, the plaintiff must
show that the employer should be liable for the actions of a supervisory
employee under the doctrine of respondeat superior.6"
In 1986, the Supreme Court expanded employer liability for sexual
harassment, recognizing that sexual harassment also exists if the
unwelcome conduct or comments create a "hostile work environment" for
the employees.6 In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, the Court first
recognized that a hostile work environment is a form of sexual
discrimination actionable under Title VII.6 Furthermore, the Court held
that Title VII is not limited to "tangible" discrimination, but also applies to
sexual harassment resulting in a non-economic injury, such as emotional or
psychological damage." The plaintiff in Meritor, female bank employee
Mechelle Vinson, filed suit against Meritor Savings Bank and the Vice
President of the bank, Sidney Taylor.69 Ms. Vinson alleged that Taylor had
constantly subjected her to sexual harassment.0 Ms. Vinson recounted that
Taylor invited her to dinner, during which he suggested they have sexual
intercourse at a motel.7' At first Ms. Vinson refused to comply, but she
eventually agreed out of fear of losing her job.72 She further alleged that
Taylor fondled her in front of other employees, exposed himself to her and
forcibly raped her on more than one occasion
73
In establishing that a hostile work environment can constitute
actionable sex discrimination under Title VII in the wake of Meritor, courts
have identified five elements which a plaintiff must prove: (1) membership
in a protected class; (2) gender-based harassment; (3) unwelcome and
severe harassment; (4) hostility in the workplace under both an objective
and subjective standard and (5) that the employer "knew or should have
known" of the sexual harassment and failed to remedy it.
74
An understanding of Title VII is necessary to understand how courts
initially responded to sexual harassment in schools. The Supreme Court
first applied Title VII jurisprudence to sexual harassment in schools in the
landmark case of Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools. 75 Franklin
64. See Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63-68 (1986).
65. See Giampetro-Meyer et al., supra note 29, at 307. Respondeat superior is defined as
"[t]he common law doctrine holding an employer.., liable for the employee's.., actions
committed during the scope of employment." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 546 (1996).
66. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64-68.
67. Id.
68. See id.
69. See id. at 59.




74. Giampetro-Meyer et al., supra note 29, at 308.
75. 503 U.S. 60,75 (1992).
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was also the first Title IX sexual harassment case considered by the
Supreme Court.76 The primary issue in Franklin was whether a student
who had been sexually harassed by a teacher could receive monetary
damages from the school under Title IX.7 1 In their decision, the Justices
unanimously held that schools could be held liable for monetary damages
for violating Title IX.
s
Christine Franklin, a female high school student, alleged that over the
course of two years, Mr. Andrew Hill, an athletic coach and teacher
employed by the school district, subjected her to "continual sexual
harassment., 79  Ms. Franklin alleged that beginning in the fall of her
sophomore year, Hill forcibly kissed her in the school parking lot,
telephoned her at home, engaged her in sexually explicit conversations and
interrupted one of her classes to take her to a private office where he
subjected her to "coercive intercourse."80  Furthermore, Ms. Franklin
alleged that school officials, aware of this behavior, investigated the matter
but failed to take action to protect her."' The school district even
discouraged Franklin from reporting Mr. Hill to the authorities.82
In spite of these serious allegations, the United States District Court
dismissed Ms. Franklin's complaint, stating that "Title IX does not
authorize an award of damages."83 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower
court's decision.' Reversing the Circuit Court's decision, the Supreme
Court acknowledged that "where legal rights have been invaded, and a
federal statute provides a general right to sue for such invasion, federal
courts may use any available remedy to make good the wrong done."8"
Therefore, the Court recognized that monetary damages were an
appropriate remedy for a Title IX violation.
Franklin is important, not just because it recognized damages as an
appropriate remedy, but also because it analogized sexual harassment in the
workplace to sexual harassment in the schools. Issuing a strong statement
opposing sexual harassment in schools, the Court stated:
Unquestionably, Title IX placed on the Gwinnett County Public
Schools the duty not to discriminate on the basis of sex, and "when
76. See Emmalena K. Quesada, Innocent Kiss or Potential Legal Nightmare: Peer Sexual
Harassment and the Standard for School Liability Under Title IX, 83 CORNELL L. REV.
1014,1024 (1998).
77. 503 U.S. at 63.
78. See id. at 64-77.
79. Id. at 63.
80. Id.
81. See id. at 64.
82. See id.
83. Id.
84. See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 911 F.2d 617 (11th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 503
U.S. 60 (1992).
85. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 66 (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)).
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a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate because of the
subordinate's sex, that supervisor 'discriminate[s]' on the basis of
sex." We believe the same rule should apply when a teacher
sexually harasses and abuses a student. 6
However, the Court failed to address what standard of liability was
applicable to Title IX sexual harassment claims. Therefore, the "question
of whether students should have the same, or even more, protection in the
educational setting under Title IX as workers have in the employment
setting under Title VII ... puzzled" courts and educators.'
The Supreme Court finally addressed the issue of the correct standard
of liability in Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District." Prior to
this decision, the Supreme Court issued opinions in two pivotal cases in its
1997 term. In Faragher v. City of Boca Raton89 and Burlington Industry,
Inc. v. Ellerth,9° the Supreme Court adopted the theory of vicarious liability
for the workplace. Under this theory, an employee could recover damages
against the employer for the actions of a supervisor even if the employer
did not have actual knowledge of the supervisor's actions.9 Therefore,
while it was clear that schools could be held liable for the actions of their
employees, the myriad of court opinions failed to produce a clear legal
framework under which cases could be heard and school boards could
operate. 2  Finally, in 1998, the Supreme Court in Gebser definitively
answered the question of what standard of liability applies to teacher on
student sexual harassment in schools.
A discussion of the facts surrounding Gebser illustrates the severe
emotional consequences that sexual harassment can have on a child. While
in the eighth-grade, plaintiff, Alida Gebser, joined a book discussion group
led by Frank Waldrop, a teacher at Lago Vista High School." Ms. Gebser
alleged that during the discussion sessions, Mr. Waldrop made sexually
suggestive comments.' Upon entering high school, Ms. Gebser was
enrolled in one of Mr. Waldrop's classes.95 During class, Mr. Waldrop
continued making sexually suggestive comments and began directing these
comments towards Ms. Gebser.96 In the spring of her freshman year, Mr.
86. Id. at 75 (quoting Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64).
87. Jan Alan Neiger, Actual Knowledge Under Gebser v. Lago Vista: Evidence of the
Court's Deliberate Indifference or an Appropriate Response for Fighting Institutional
Liability?, 26 LC. & U.L. 1, 2 (1999).
88. 524 U.S. 274, 290 (1998).
89. 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998).
90. 524 U.S. 742,765 (1998).
91. See id.
92. See Neiger, supra note 87, at 37-38.
93. See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 277.
94. See id.
95. See id. at 277-78.
96. See id. at 278.
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Waldrop kissed and fondled her while visiting her at home.97 On a number
of occasions throughout the school year, the two engaged in sexual
intercourse.? This "relationship" continued into the following school year,
and while the two often engaged in sexual activity during school hours, it
never took place on school property.99
During this time, parents of other students complained to the
administration about what they believed were inappropriate comments
made by Mr. Waldrop.' ° While the principal discussed the complaints with
Mr. Waldrop, he failed to notify the school superintendent, who was the
school district's Title IX coordinator.' °' A few months later a police officer
discovered Mr. Waldrop and Ms. Gebser engaged in sexual activity and
arrested Mr. Waldrop.' °2 In response, the school immediately terminated
his employment.' °3
The district court rejected Gebser's Title IX claim, finding that in order
to be liable a school district must have actual notice of the alleged sexual
harassment.' Further, the court held that in this case the evidence
presented "was inadequate to raise a genuine issue on whether the school
district had actual or constructive notice that Waldrop was involved in a
sexual relationship with a student."' 5 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district
court's opinion and held that a school district is not liable for teacher on
student sexual harassment under Title IX unless (1) the school board or the
proper employee knew or should have known of the abuse, (2) the person
had the power to end the abuse and (3) failed to do so."6
The Supreme Court responded to the lower court's decision, centering
its opinion on the question of whether a school should be held liable for the
acts of employees when the school itself did not know about the
harassment. Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor distinguished Title
IX from Title VII, stating that while Title VII's goal is to remedy
discrimination throughout the economy and to compensate victims, "Title
IX focuses more on 'protecting' individuals from discriminatory practices
carried out by recipients of federal funds."'0 7 The majority held that it
would therefore "frustrate the purposes of Title IX to permit a damages





101. See id. The Title IX coordinator is responsible for ensuring the school district




104. See id. at 279.
105. Id.
106. See id at 279-80.
107. Id. at 287.
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student based on principles of respondeat superior or constructive notice,
i.e., without actual notice to a school district official."'' 8 Furthermore, the
Court held that damages were only appropriate when an official "who at a
minimum has the authority to address the alleged discrimination and to
institute corrective measures on the recipient's behalf has actual
knowledge... and fails to adequately respond."' 9  Therefore, an
appropriate school official must have actual knowledge and the school
official's failure to stop the harassment must amount to deliberate
indiference.
The body of case law that the Supreme Court had to this point
developed clearly identified sexual harassment as a form of sex
discrimination actionable under Title IX. However, prior to Davis, the
Court had not decided whether schools could be or should be held liable for
peer-to-peer sexual harassment. In light of this, there was a complete lack
of consensus among lower courts regarding whether school districts could
be found liable for peer-to-peer sexual harassment, and if they could, then
what was the proper standard of liability-actual notice or constructive
notice.
Ill. PEER-TO-PEER SEXUAL HARASSMENT: THE
JURISDICTIONAL SPLITS PRIOR TO DAVIS V. MONROE
COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION
Because of the failure by the Supreme Court to address the issue, there
was intense disagreement between federal courts regarding what standard
of liability, if any, should apply to peer sexual harassment. As previously
mentioned, all of the Supreme Court decisions regarding sexual harassment
in schools involved teacher on student harassment. As a result, federal
courts were left to their own devices and developed three different
approaches to this issue.
The Fourth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits adopted the constructive notice
standard established under Title VI" '  As previously discussed, under
Meritor,"' this required only that a school knew or should have known of
the sexual harassment to be liable.
108. Id. at 285.
109. Id. at 290. Under the standard established, the Court held that the school district was
not liable for damages. See id. at 292.
110. See Oona, R.-S. v. McCaffrey, 122 F.3d 1207, 1210 (9th Cir. 1997); Brzonkala v.
Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 132 F.3d 949 (4th Cir. 1997), different results
reached on reh'g en banc, 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999), aff'g sub nom. United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 1996).
111. 477 U.S. 57, 69-71 (1986). See also 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d), which stated that:
[W]ith respect to conduct between fellow employees, an employer is
responsible for acts of sexual harassment in the workplace where the
employer (or its agents or supervisory employees) knows or should have
known of the conduct, unless it can show that it took immediate and
appropriate corrective action.
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The second approach, which was the Equal Protection Test applied by
the Fifth Circuit, imposed liability only when the school responded to
sexual harassment claims differently based upon gender."' Under
Rowinsky v. Bryan Independent School District, a school district was not
liable for peer-to-peer sexual harassment absent allegations that the school
district "responded to sexual harassment claims differently based on sex. '
In rejecting the argument that Title IX imposes liability on school districts
for the acts of third parties, the court held that a plaintiff must prove that
the school intentionally discriminated against the abused student because of
the student's gender.'1 4  The court found the application of Title VII
principles of constructive notice inapplicable because in peer sexual
harassment "the key ingredient of power is missing between harasser and
victim.',
15
The third approach, utilized by the Eleventh Circuit sitting en banc in
the now overruled Davis decision, refused to find any liability for school
districts for peer sexual harassment under Title IX." 6 In reaching this
decision, the Eleventh Circuit held that "Title IX only imposes the duty on
educational institutions to 'prevent their employees from themselves
engaging in gender discrimination,' not a non-employee from
discriminating against a student."' 7
IV. DAVIS V. MONROE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION: A
CRITICAL EXAMINATION
The Supreme Court in its decision in Davis definitively resolved this
conflict between federal courts, finally answering whether peer sexual
harassment was actionable under Title IX and what the appropriate
standard of liability for such claims would be. This section focuses upon
the pertinent facts of the Davis case and offers a critique of the majority's
opinion.
In their recent decision in Davis, the Court framed the issue for
consideration as whether deliberate indifference to known acts of
harassment amounts to an intentional violation of Title IX, capable of
supporting a private damages action, when the harasser is a student rather
than a teacher."8 The Supreme Court held that a school board may be
liable for damages under Title IX in cases of peer sexual harassment "in
certain limited circumstances.""' 9  However, the Court qualified this
112. See Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006 (5th Cir. 1996).
113. Id. at 1016.
114. See Quesada, supra note 76, at 1041.
115. Id. at 1042.
116. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 120 F.3d 1390 (11th Cir. 1997), rev'd,
526 U.S. 629 (1999).
117. Quesada, supra note 76, at 1046 (citations and footnotes omitted).
118. Davis, 526 U.S. at 633.
119. Id. at 643.
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holding, requiring that to incur liability a school board must: (1) be
deliberately indifferent to the sexual harassment and (2) have actual
knowledge of the harassment.'20 Furthermore, the plaintiff must establish
that the harassment is "so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive, and
that so undermines and detracts from the victims' educational experience,
that the victim-students are effectively" deprived of access to the
educational opportunities or benefits provided by the school. 2' With this
decision, the Supreme Court finally recognized that peer sexual harassment
is a serious problem, deserving protection under Title IX. In reaching this
conclusion, the Court established an even stricter standard than Gebser,
placing the bar at such a level that, contrary to the opinion expressed by the
dissent," it will often be impossible for a plaintiff to recover against a
school board in cases of peer sexual harassment.
Beginning in December of 1992, Petitioner's minor daughter,
LaShonda, became the target of a prolonged pattern of sexual harassment
by a fellow fifth-grade classmate.'" According to the Petitioner, the
aggressor, G.F., made statements such as, "I want to get in bed with you"
and "I want to feel your boobs."' G.F. also attempted to grab LaShonda's
genitals and breasts."z After each of these instances, LaShonda reported
G.F.'s inappropriate behavior to her teacher, Diane Fort, and to her mother,
the Petitioner.'6 The Petitioner also contacted Ms. Fort to report the
harassment of her daughter.2 7 At this time, Ms. Fort allegedly reassured
the Petitioner and told her that the principal, Bill Querry, had been notified
regarding the incidents." However, no disciplinary actions were
apparently taken to remedy G.F.'s behavior. 29
This pattern of abusive behavior continued for several more months,
and in February of 1993, G.F.'s harassment escalated to include physical
contact. In one particularly disturbing incident, G.F. placed a doorstop in
his pants and "proceeded to act in a sexually suggestive manner towards
LaShonda during physical education class."'30 Less than one week later,
120. See id. at 633.
121. Id. at 651 (emphasis in original).
122. See id. at 654-86. Justice Kennedy's dissent stated: "[T]he majority's liability
standards will allow almost any plaintiff to get to summary judgment, if not to a jury." Id.
at 680. For a discussion of the dissenting opinion in Davis, see Joan E. Shaffner, Davis v.
Monroe County Board of Education: The Unresolved Questions, 21 WOMEN's RTS. L. REP.
79, 83-84 (2000) ("The dissent claimed that '[t]he prospect of unlimited Title IX liability,
will.., breed a climate of fear that encourages school administrators to label even the most
innocuous childish conduct sexual harassment."').
123. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 633.
124. Id.
125. See id.
126. See id. at 633-34.





G.F. again engaged in sexually harassing behavior.3 ' In April of 1993,
G.F. allegedly pressed his body against LaShonda in "a sexually suggestive
manner."'3 LaShonda reported each incident to a teacher and the Petitioner
contacted the teachers to follow up on the complaint.
3
However, the behavior did not stop until May of 1993, when G.F. was
charged with, and pled guilty to, sexual battery.'34 As a result of the
prolonged sexual harassment, LaShonda's grades dropped because of her
inability to concentrate on her schoolwork in the face of continued abuse.'35
Moreover, LaShonda contemplated suicide, going so far as to write a
suicide note and telling her mother that she "didn't know how much longer
she could keep [G.F.] off her.'
36
As if the experience of LaShonda taken by itself was not sufficient to
warrant the school administration's involvement, it was also alleged that
numerous other girls were targets of G.F.'s harassment as well.'37 In fact, a
group of female students, including LaShonda, attempted to discuss the
abuse with the principal.' According to the complaint, however, their
efforts proved futile. "[A] teacher denied the students' request [to meet
with the principal] with the statement, 'If [Querry] wants you, he'll call
you.""39 Furthermore, when the Petitioner asked the principal what action
would be taken to stop the behavior, Principal Querry stated, "I guess I'll
have to threaten him a little bit harder.', 4 0 At no point, according to the
complaint, was G.F. ever disciplined for his actions. 4' Furthermore,
Querry even asked the Petitioner why LaShonda "was the only one
complaining.' 42 LaShonda was only allowed to move her classroom seat
away from G.F. after more than three months of reported complaints
43
In response to the school's failure to respond to the allegations and
protect LaShonda, the Petitioner filed suit in district court, alleging "[t]he
persistent sexual advances and harassment by the student G.F. upon
[LaShonda] interfered with her ability to attend school and perform her
studies and activities," and that "[t]he deliberate indifference by the
Defendants to the unwelcome sexual advances of a student upon LaShonda
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environment in violation of Title IX.'" The district court dismissed the
claim, concluding that absent an allegation that the school board or an
employee of the school board was involved in the harassment, Title IX
provided no liability.' 45 On appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, the dismissal of
Petitioner's claim was reversed. 46 Analogizing to Title VII, the Eleventh
Circuit panel determined that peer sexual harassment stated a cause of
action under Title IX:
[W]e conclude that as Title VII encompasses a claim for damages
due to a sexually hostile working environment created by co-
workers and tolerated by the employer, Title IX encompasses a
claim for damages due to a sexually hostile educational
environment created by a fellow student or students when the
supervising authorities knowingly fail to act to eliminate the
harassment.'47
However, in an en banc hearing the Eleventh Circuit reversed the
decision of the panel and affirmed the district court's decision to dismiss
Petitioner's claim. 4 Relying upon the understanding that Title IX was
passed pursuant to Congress's authority under the Spending Clause of the
United States Constitution, 4 the Court held that the statute must provide
"potential recipients of federal education funding with 'unambiguous
notice of the conditions they are assuming when they accept' it."'5° They
held that the language of Title IX fails to give adequate notification to
funding recipients that they have a duty to prevent peer sexual
harassment.' In a dissent, four judges urged that the failure of the statute
to identify "the perpetrator of the discrimination" indicates that it covers
misconduct by third parties as well as employees,'52 reasoning that the plain
language of the statute provided sufficient notice to a district that failure to
respond to peer sexual harassment could trigger liability.
53
In response to the confusion among lower courts regarding the scope of
Title IX, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the issue of
whether and when a school district may be held liable for peer sexual
harassment under Title IX. As previously stated, the Supreme Court
reversed the en banc decision of the Eleventh Circuit and held that peer
sexual harassment is a violation of Title IX for which school districts may
144. Id. at 636.
145. See id. (citing Davis, 862 F. Supp. 363, 368 (M.D. Ga. 1994)).
146. See id. (citing Davis, 74F.3d 1186, 1195 (11th Cir. 1996)).
147. Id. (quoting Davis, 74 F.3d at 1193).
148. See id. at 637 (citing Davis, 120 F.3d 1390, 1390 (1lth Cir. 1997) (en banc)).
149. See id. (citing Davis, 120 F.3d at 1399); see also U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
150. Id. (quoting Davis, 120 F.3d at 1399).
151. See id. (citing Davis, 120 F.3d at 1401).
152. Id.
153. See id.
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be held liable. The Court established that a plaintiff must meet a two prong
test for a school district to incur liability. "' The plaintiff must show that
the school acted (1) with deliberate indifference to the sexual harassment
and (2) had actual knowledge of the harassment.155 Furthermore, the
harassment must interfere with the sexually harassed student's ability to
achieve an education and deprive that student of educational opportunity. '
5 6
In establishing the first prong of the test, requiring a school respond
with deliberate indifference, the Court simply applied the same standard it
had established in Gebser 5 7 In Gebser, the Court stated that deliberate
indifference was the appropriate standard because "[u]nder a lower
standard, there would be a risk that the recipient would be liable in
damages not for its own official decision but instead for its employees'
actions."' '58
Under the deliberate indifference standard established by the Court,
what amount of action by schools is enough and what level of inaction
amounts to deliberate indifference? In establishing this standard, the Court
fails to identify what response by schools is adequate and what response is
inadequate. The Court only states that the school "must merely respond to
known harassment in a manner that is not clearly unreasonable."'5 9 If a
school administrator suspends the perpetrator from school for one day,
even for one week, is that sufficient to avoid liability? Applying the facts
of Davis, if Principal Querry had responded by moving LaShonda's seating
assignment in class, or transferred her to another class, would that have
been sufficient action? Assuming that such actions had been taken, in all
likelihood the sexual harassment would have continued. Under the Court's
opinion, it is possible that although the school has failed to protect
LaShonda, they are no longer liable under Title IX because they have not
responded with "deliberate indifference."
The second prong of the test, which requires that the school have actual
notice of the sexual harassment, is equally troubling. A more appropriate
standard of liability would be the constructive notice standard, requiring
that the school knew or should have known of the harassment. Before
addressing why a constructive notice standard, developed according to
Title VII cases, is the better standard, we must examine arguments set forth
by the Court and commentators against the application of the constructive
notice standard.
In Davis, the Supreme Court operates under an assumption that actual
knowledge is the correct standard of liability. In arguing that the
154. See id. at 642-43.
155. See id. at 643.
156. See id. at 650.
157. 524 U.S. 274, 290 (1998).
158. Id. at290-91.
159. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 649 (1999).
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constructive notice standard established under Title VII is inapplicable to
Title IX, the employment context has been distinguished from the
educational context. Opponents to the constructive notice standard have
stated that schools are not able to control students to the same extent that
employers can control their employees.' 6' Furthermore, "in light of the
inherent difficulties in controlling the behaviors of children, the possibility
of imposing significant legal liability on a school system based on the
behavior of an uncontrollable student can be difficult to justify.'' Others
also rationalize the rejection of the constructive notice standard because
school administrators "cannot and do not want the additional responsibility
of monitoring and controlling student-on-student interactions to prevent
harassment."' 62 In a survey, one principal even stated that although he
believed "that the school should control blatant sexual harassment, subtle
types of harassment, including sexually suggestive comments and
excessive flirtation, were beyond the school's power to control."' 63
We should look to the similarities that exist in the two spheres of work
and school, rather than simply say that schools are different from
employment. This comparison between the workplace and schools
illustrates that adoption of the constructive notice standard by the Court
would have been more appropriate and provided better protection to
students. First, as the Fifth Circuit articulated, "there is no meaningful
distinction between the work and the school environment which would
forbid such discrimination in the former context and tolerate it in the
latter."'64  The similarities between the workplace and schools are
numerous, including that attendance is required. In the workplace, most
individuals must go to work every day or at least regularly to support
themselves and their families. Similarly, parents, society in general and the
government compel students to attend school regularly.'65 Should not the
government have "a heightened obligation to safeguard students whom it
compels to attend?" '66
Furthermore, the differences between students in schools and
employees in a workplace setting increase the need for a more protective
constructive notice standard. Students are even more constrained than
employees are because they must attend the public school for the district in
which they live unless they are able to afford a private school.
160. See Giampetro-Meyer et al., supra note 29, at 316.
161. Id.
162. Id. (footnotes and citations omitted).
163. Id. (footnotes and citations omitted).
164. Doe v. Independent Sch. Dist., 975 F.2d 137, 149 (5th Cir. 1992), vacated, 15 F.3d
443 (5th Cir. 1994).
165. Currently, all fifty states have compulsory attendance laws, requiring students to
attend school regularly.
166. New Jersey v. TLO, 469 U.S. 325, 353 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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Elementary and secondary students are essentially captives in their
educational environment. An employee can change jobs more
easily than a student may change schools .... A student is often
restricted to certain school districts ... transferring to a private
school is not an option .... As economically difficult as it may be
for adults to leave a hostile workplace, it is virtually impossible for
children to leave their assigned school.' 6'
Moreover, school administrators exercise a higher level of control over
students than an employer does over employees. The school, under the
law, assumes supervision and custody of students during school hours such
that they made be held liable for injury to students during school hours.
Both the similarities and the differences emphasize the necessity for at
least the constructive notice standard for Title IX liability for peer sexual
harassment. These illustrate the obvious conclusion that a student who is a
victim of peer sexual harassment "should not be required to make a more
difficult showing" than an adult who is a victim of sexual harassment in the
workplace. 69 "[T]he distinctions between the school environment and the
workplace serve only to emphasize the need for zealous protection against
sex discrimination in schools.' 7 °
Nevertheless, it is true that an employment relationship differs from
that of a school/student relationship. Clearly, the ways in which schools
respond to a student who sexually harasses another student must be
different from the remedies available to an employer. An employer may
terminate the employment of an employee who engages in sexually
harassing behavior. While a school district may not "fire" a student, they
do have a variety of solutions available to them that are analogous. For
instance, a school may remove the student from the class, issue a
suspension, or even expel the student. While this may create additional
costs for the school district in placing the expelled students elsewhere, the
expense incurred would be well worth it when one considers the
incalculable benefits of an education free from sexual harassment. The
additional expense is worth the benefits of empowering generations of girls
and young women.
Furthermore, the Court went one step beyond Gebser, requiring that in
cases of peer sexual harassment not only must the school be deliberately
indifferent to sexual harassment of which they have knowledge, but the
harassment must be of such severity that it deprives the victim of access to
educational opportunities before liability will attach. Unfortunately, the
167. Giampetro-Meyer et al., supra note 29, at 318-19 (footnotes and citations omitted).
168. See Carrie Baker, Proposed Title IX Guidelines on Sex-Based Harassment of
Students, 43 EMORY L.J. 271, 291 (1994).
169. Giampetro-Meyer et al., supra note 29, at 320.
170. Patricia H. v. Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1288, 1292-93 (N.D. Cal.
1993).
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Court fails to identify what behavior will satisfy this requirement. While it
is therefore clear that peer sexual harassment is actionable, the question
remains: where does the Court-and thus school districts--draw the line
"between childish behavior and 'actionable' harassment."
171
V. POLICY: USING ALTERNATIVE METHODS FOR
ANALYZING SCHOOL LIABILITY
In the Davis decision, the Supreme Court affords substantially less
protection to students than it does to adults in the workplace. Essentially,
the Supreme Court held that "students are separate, less equal, and more
vulnerable legally to sexual harassment under Title IX than are adult
workers under Title VIL."' The question now arises: Is there another form
of relief available to students who are sexually harassed by their peers?
Initially scholars argued that the answer might lie in the traditional notion
of in loco parentis, 3 where school administrators exercise considerable
control over students for numerous reasons. School officials "are
considered to stand in loco parentis towards students to protect them from
exposure to such things as sexually explicit, indecent, or lewd speech; [and]
school officials may also administer corporal punishment to exercise
disciplinary control if it is required."'"
Unfortunately, despite the level of control that schools exert over the
lives of students, the Supreme Court has held that schools do not stand in
loco parentis under the law.'75 The Court instead stated that school
administrators "do not merely exercise authority voluntarily conferred on
them by individual parents" but instead they act "as representatives of the
state, not merely as surrogates for the parents.' 76
We require attendance at school up to a certain age, enforcing this
government mandate through truancy laws. If the government requires
students to attend school and decides which schools they may attend, then
the government must accept some responsibility for their safety. Schools
are parents during the school day. Not only are students compelled to
attend them, the school tells them what to wear, what they can and cannot
say, and even discusses intimate issues such as sexuality. It is logical that
as a result schools should be held to stand in loco parentis.
171. Shaffner, supra note 122, at 82.
172. Jeffrey A. Thaler, Are Schools Protecting Children from Harassment? Not Well
Enough, and the U.S. Supreme Court's Recent Interpretation of Title IX is Shielding Schools
from Liability, 35 AUG. TRIAL 32, 33 (1999).
173. The literal translation of the Latin phrase "in loco parentis" is "in the place of the
parents." Specifically, the school acts as the parent, with all the legal responsibilities,
during school hours. See id. at 32.
174. Giampetro-Meyer et al., supra note 29, at 319 (citations and footnotes omitted).
175. See Thaler, supra note 172, at 33; see also DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of
Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989); New Jersey v. TLO, 469 U.S. 325, 336 (1985).
176. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 336 (1985).
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An alternative solution to the current problem is to create a state
remedy. Various states have enacted statutes making it a violation of state
law to allow or fail to remedy peer sexual harassment. Minnesota requires
all schools to have a specific policy which condemns sexual harassment.'77
Massachusetts, California and Colorado all forbid sexual harassment by
statute but do not mandate that individual school districts establish policies
against sexual harassment. h7 In passing such statutes, states need not rely
on the provisions set forth in Title IX. Furthermore, they need not utilize
the rationale set forth in the Supreme Court, but they may instead remedy
peer sexual harassment in a way that they see fit, offering the protection to
their students that they deserve.
While the creation of a state-based remedy would certainly be a step in
the right direction, it would not ensure that all U.S. students receive the
same level of protection. Therefore, the best way to achieve a remedy to
peer sexual harassment is for Congress to amend Title IX to include a
provision regarding peer-to-peer sexual harassment. This amendment must
legislatively establish a constructive notice standard as a response to the
Supreme Court's decision in Davis. Specifically, the amendment to Title
IX should:
Include the term sexual harassment.
Include a definition of sexual harassment, which incorporates peer
sexual harassment as well as teacher on student harassment.
Establish constructive notice as the appropriate standard under
which courts should determine liability.
Therefore, Title IX § 1681 should be amended to read:
No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any education program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance.
For the purposes of this Title, discrimination on the basis of sex
shall include sexual harassment that is by teachers on students and
by students against other students.
Sexual Harassment is defined as: sexual attention, which is
unwanted, from peers, teachers, school administrators, and
coaches, or anyone with whom the victim must interact in order to
fulfill school duties, which creates a hostile or offensive
177. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 127-46 (West 1994).
178. See Nash, supra note 26, at 1135-36.
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educational environment.
The recipient of Federal financial assistance shall be held liable if
they knew or should have known of the discrimination and failed to
remedy it.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is well established that peer sexual harassment is a pervasive part of
the educational landscape. Failure to respond adequately to the abuse of
children while they are in school has long-range and far-reaching
consequences. Unfortunately, while clearly a step in the right direction, the
recent Supreme Court decision in Davis leaves schoolchildren without
adequate protection. Instead, the Court provides less protection and legal
redressability than that granted to adult victims of sexual harassment-who
are in a better position to protect themselves. Victims of peer-to-peer
sexual harassment are forced to look to other avenues to redress their
injury. Some states have responded to this in passing statutes that set the
bar higher than the Supreme Court in Davis. Adoption of the in loco
parentis doctrine is another alternative.
Ultimately, Congress must amend Title IX to ensure all of America's
students have adequate protection from peer sexual harassment. School
administrators, teachers and parents must recognize the damage sexual
harassment can inflict on young people and seek to remedy it instead of
excusing peer-to-peer harassment as instances of "boys being boys." It
must be the goal of every member of Congress, school administrator,
teacher and parent to eradicate peer sexual harassment from our schools
and finally guarantee all children equal access to an education.
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